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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Larry

Ray

Halbert appeals from his judgment 0f conviction for felony

DUI and vehicular

manslaughter, challenging the district court’s denial of his motion t0 dismiss.

Statement

Of The

Facts

The underlying
motion

And Course Of The Proceedings
summarized by the

facts,

district court in its

order denying Halbert’s

t0 dismiss, are as follows:

from December 13, 2017, When it is alleged
law enforcement and EMS responded t0 an automobile collision on US 93,
Jerome County, Idaho. According t0 police reports, Defendant [Halbert] crossed
the center line striking a car traveling southbound in a head 0n collision. Due t0
the impact of the collision, Defendant was extricated from his vehicle and

The charges

in this case arise

immediately transported t0

Ann Miller,
(R.,

St.

Luke’s Magic Valley in Twin

the driver in the southbound lane,

succumbed

to her injuries

on scene.

p.223 (footnotes omitted).)

While extracting Halbert from
inside

his vehicle, ofﬁcers

saw “multiple cans 0f Keystone

light

and around the vehicle,” and “two open bottles of Fireball Whiskey and a case 0f Keystone

Light” inside the vehicle.
sevenl prior

(R., pp.17-18.)

DUI convictions—had a BAC

A blood
of .259.

alcohol test

(Defendant’s EX.

1.)

The presentence

(PSI, pp.21-24.)

Both

his legs

had “open

showed

that

St.

Luke’s Magic Valley Hospital.
with protruding

fracture[s]

investigator reported that Halbert accumulated seven

On

Halbert—who had

(R., p.18.)

Halbert underwent emergency surgery that night at

1

Cheryl

Falls, Idaho.

tibia,”

DUIs before

which

this one.

the day of sentencing Halbert disputed this, claiming that one 0f the seven

DUIs belonged to a “different Larry Halbert.” (12/16/19 Tr., p.66, Ls.10-18.) The prosecutor
responded that “probation and parole is pretty thorough on their criminal histories,” but that she
“did not 100k into” the purported error “t0 be able to verify
Ls.16-19.)

The

district court

it

or not.”

(12/16/19 Tr., p.118,

never made the requested change t0 the PSI

Halbert has not claimed this was an error on appeal

(ﬂ Appellant’s brief).

(ﬂ

PSI, p.21) and

required the doctor t0 “put[] the fracture fragments together like a puzzle” and hold them

“together with

pins” and screws. (State’s EX. 102, pp.1-2.) After six or seven days, Halbert

drill

was discharged from

the hospital,

agents executing a “Parole

p.1

1,

went home, and was then arrested by Department of Correction

Commission Warrant”

(9/9/2019 Tr., p.10, L.11

in a separate case.

—

L.6; PSI, p.26.)

“For the next year,” Halbert “was provided signiﬁcant medical treatment While in the
custody of IDOC.”

Some 0f that

(R., p.223.)

Alphonsus hospital

(ﬂ

9/9/2019

Tr., p.11,

time was spent

(ﬂ

State’s EX. 104, p.5),

ISCI Inﬁrmary and Saint

L.18 — p.12, L.7), where Halbert continued to be
This included two follow-up surgeries in early

treated for the injuries sustained in the accident.

2018

at the

and a post-operative appointment

in February, 2018,

Where the

doctor noted Halbert would be “nonweightbearing for planned 12 weeks” (State’s EX. 104, p3).
In April 0f 2018, Halbert sent an

need some knee braces t0 help With

IDOC

stability

Health Services Request form, Which stated “I

While

I

learn

how

to

walk again”—Halbert

later

testiﬁed that his “knee had been shattered” and he “was just looking for options for walking.”

(State’s EX. 105, p.2; 9/9/2019 Tr., p.14, Ls.14-21.)

By then,

Halbert had dozens of fractures on

both legs, and had accumulated “9 surgeries t0” his feet and “below

[his]

knee.”

(E State’s EX.

106.)

Shortly thereafter, in June 2018, an X-ray

screws” 0f Halbert’s
point that the

tibia,

wound was

and Halbert reported

at this

is

his

“failure

of hardware

at the

proximal 3

lower right leg was “severely swollen t0 the

actually pulling apart,” causing “[serious] drainage,” with “pain to the

point he [could not] bear any weight” on

concluded “[t]here

showed a

it.

(State’s EX. 104, p.5.)

some question 0f Whether

The physician’s

the large defect Within [Halbert’s] tibia

assistant

is

healed

time as he has signiﬁcant pain and cannot bear weight whatsoever.” (State’s EX. 104, p.6.)

Following another surgery, in August of 2018, the physician’s assistant ordered Halbert to wear a
“walker boot” and to “remain nonweightbearing on the right lower extremity for an additional 5

weeks.”

(State’s EX. 104, p.7.)

accident, [Halbert]

The

was

in the

still

prior year, in

March

“By January of 2019,”
Medical Annex

IDOC.”2

23, 2018, the state

complaint, alleging one count of felony

(R., pp.13-14, 220-21.)

at

On February

“from the Idaho State Penitentiary

the court found, “over a year after the

(R., p.223.)

had ﬁled an

DUI and one

arrest warrant

count of felony vehicular manslaughter.

14, 2019, the magistrate issued

to

and criminal

Jerome County,” and the

an order t0 transport Halbert

district court

found that the

warrant was served on Halbert “in Jerome County 0n February 15, 2019.” (R., p.221; PSI, p.6.)

A Jerome

County jail Medical Intake form reported

out of [the] Medical

Annex

for 3 weeks,”

that at that point Halbert

and “might have

had “only

to [1056]” his right leg.

been

(State’s EX.

103 (capitalization a1tered).)
Halbert’s initial appearance before the magistrate

221.) After counsel

was on February

was appointed, Halbert twice requested

Which the court granted.

19, 2019.

(R., pp., 21,

to continue the preliminary hearing,

(R., pp.55-59, 84-88.)

Halbert ultimately waived his preliminary hearing (R., pp.92-93), and the district court set
his arraignment for

May

6,

2019

(R.,

Halbert subsequently

p.95).

moved

to

change the

arraignment t0 an earlier date, citing ongoing “physical therapy Via the Idaho Department of
Corrections,” and claiming that “once Mr. Halbert

County

2

The

in the instant case, “he is to

arraigned in District Court” in Jerome

be transported back to the Idaho penitentiary

court’s reference to “Medical

Medical Annex, Which Halbert

is

later

Annex

IDOC”

facilities”

where

presumably a reference to the ISCI
afﬁrmed was “considered a medical annex,” but was “not a
at

hospital situation,” but rather “general population.”

is

(ﬂ 9/9/2019

T11, p.1 1,

L.18 — p.12, L.7.)

he would “be able t0 resume his medical treatment.”
(R., pp.101-02),

and Halbert was arraigned on the

The court granted

(R., p.98.)

state’s

Information Part

I

and Part

the motion

II

(alleging

Halbert had two prior felony DUIs), 0n April 29, 2019 (R., pp. 103-06). Halbert entered a plea of
not guilty, and the district court set a status conference for August

September 24.

from Jerome County

Jail t0 ISCI, so that

Which the court granted.

On

Thereafter, Halbert

(R., p.1 15.)

Halbert,

Who was

moved

still

in

t0 vacate the

IDOC

from the car crash.”

reset the status conference t0

On August

5,

was

at that facility,”

August

5,

2019

status conference.

was “scheduled

t0

undergo” another surgery the

The

(R., p.127.)

district court

t0 repair

damage

(R., p.129.)

and federal constitutional speedy

the ﬁling 0f the complaint

by

arraigned on the charge until February 2019.”

trial rights

it,

he argued

were

violated,

on March 23, 2018,” but “was not

(R., p.133.)

Per Halbert,

this

was “highly

prejudicial” to him:

The

State has

had over a year

to build its case against

Mr. Halbert. Now,

Mr. Halbert must contact Witnesses, gather evidence, and attempt
times, places and people

more than one

[sic]

Halbert at a signiﬁcant disadvantage and
Therefore, because

and

the

criminal

commencement 0f
rights t0 a

speedy

it

is

t0 recall facts,

after the incident; this puts

highly prejudicial to

his

Mr.
case.

has taken almost one year between the ﬁling of the warrant

complaint

and

the

execution

of the

warrant

and

the

the trial process, Mr. Halbert’s statutory and constitutional
trial

to his

granted the motion and

2019, Halbert ﬁled a motion t0 dismiss. (R., pp.131-33.) In

‘accused’

(R.,

custody, asked that the conference be rescheduled

August 26, 2019.

that his statutory, state constitutional,

insofar as “he

0n

an order transporting him

The “scheduled surgery” was “intended

(R., p.126.)

leg(s) that resulted

to the court for

set the case for trial

he could “resume his medical treatment

“to a date in early September,” because he

following week.

and

(R., pp.1 16, 121.)

July 31, 2019, Halbert

pp.126-27.)

moved

5,

have been abrogated.

For these reasons, the charges

against Mr. Halbert should be dismissed with prejudice.

(R.,

p.133 (internal citations omitted).)

Amended

Information Part

I,

Part

II

While Halbert’s motion was pending, the

(alleging

state

two prior felony DUIs), and Part

III

ﬁled an

(alleging

Halbert was a persistent Violator). (R., pp.178—83.)
Thereafter, the district court held an evidentiary hearing

(E

generally 9/9/19 Tr.)

transported Halbert.

failed t0

motion

show any

on Halbert’s motion

to dismiss.

Halbert testiﬁed, as did the Jerome County Sheriff’s deputy

(9/9/19 Tr., p.10, L.3

—

statutory3 0r constitutional

to dismiss. (9/9/19 Tr., p.52, L.13

The

p.28, L.13.)

speedy

district court

who

concluded Halbert

and accordingly denied the

trial Violations,

— p.55, L9.)

In a subsequent written decision, the district court “explain[ed] at length the rationale for

[its]

total

decision.” (9/9/19 Tr., p.55, Ls.6-7; R., pp.220-31.)

The court

ﬁrst found that the 17-month

delay between the ﬁling 0f the complaint and motion t0 dismiss was a “presumptively

prejudicial” delay, insofar as

it

was sufﬁciently lengthy t0

Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), and the Idaho cases

trigger ﬁthher scrutiny

that incorporated

it

(R., p.225).

under Barker

Looking

V.

at the

reason for the delay, the court found that the ﬁrst 13 months, in which Halbert received
“substantial medical treatment” for his severe injuries following the car crash,

was justiﬁed:

Without question, Defendant was severely injured after the car accident
t0 treat the injuries from the automobile accident

and the level of care required

were outside of

that

normally provided

at the

Jerome County

Jail.

Furthermore,

providing this level 0f care to the Defendant would have constituted a ﬁnancial
hardship for Jerome County, and the task 0f transporting Defendant t0 surgeons,
physical therapists, radiologists and other medical providers after the accident

would have posed a host 0f

logistical difﬁculties for the

Jerome County

Jail.

Thus, the State’s decision t0 delay transporting the Defendant t0 Jerome County
for the ﬁrst

13-months

legitimate reason not t0
constitutes

good cause

after the

move

Criminal Complaint was ﬁled constituted a

The Court

the case forward.

for delaying the case.

Indeed,

IDOC

also
is

ﬁnds

that this

better suited t0

provide this level of acute care to inmates in Defendant’s condition and there can

3

Halbert has since abandoned his statutory speedy

claims of constitutional error.

trial

(E generally Appellant’s

claims.

brief.)

On

appeal, he only presses

certainly be considerable value in having continuity of care in the

With the same providers.

same

However, Jerome County has the duty

facility

t0 provide

reasonable medical care for inmates in their custody, and this factor should not

weigh against Defendant
decision t0

was Jerome County’s conscious
him from IDOC 0n account of his medical

in this analysis as

delay transporting

it

condition.

(R., pp.227-28.)

This was a “legitimate” delay, the court concluded, but also “not attributed

directly t0” Halbert; thus, the court

The

found “the

court additionally found that the subsequent four

district

“following [Halbert’s] arrival in Jerome
t0”

13-month delay

initial

by Halbert.

C0unty”—“was

to

be neutral.”

(R., p.228.)

months of delay—the time

attributable to, agreed to, 0r acquiesced

(Id.)

Turning t0 the assertion

itself,

the court concluded that Halbert

had

failed t0 assert his

right in a timely fashion:

Nothing

in this case indicates that

Defendant requested a speedy

before he submitted his Motion to Dismiss 0n August

5,

2019.

In fact,

trial

it is

the

practice of this Court t0 schedule [a] status conference before trial to address pretrial

issues such as this, but Defendant vacated that hearing t0 be transported t0

IDOC

t0 continue receiving

0f raising

this issue earlier,

medical treatment after multiple continuances. Instead

Defendant waited

until

two months before

his trial to

raise this issue for the ﬁrst time.

(R., p.229.)

The court pointed out

weeks before the scheduled

trial

that

date,”

“assert his right t0 a speedy trial.”

“entitled strong evidentiary weight”

trial

it

“heard arguments” on Halbert’s motion to dismiss “just

and

(Id.)

that “[a]t

Thus, the

n0 point before” the motion did Halbert
district court

found that

this

factor—one

under Barker—did “not weigh in favor of ﬁnding a speedy

Violation.” (R., pp.228-29.)

The court then analyzed “the most important” Barker factor—“prejudice
caused by the delay.”

(R., p.229.)

The court found,

t0 the

accused

for several reasons, that Halbert “failed to

demonstrate he has suffered meaningful 0r even any speciﬁc prejudice by the State’s delay in
bringing this case t0

The

trial.”

district court

(R.,

pp.230-3 1 .)

concluded by balancing the “four foregoing factors”:

Jerome County and serving
Which must be weighed against the state.
Subsequent delay occurred because Defendant wanted to continue treatment in the
custody 0f IDOC, and, thus, was in-part attributable to the Defendant.
Additionally, Defendant’s pre-trial incarceration in this case was done on an
entirely different criminal matter, and the Defendant has failed to articulate
In this case, the delay in transporting the Defendant t0

the warrant

came from

neutral reasons,

persuasive prejudice as a result of the State’s delay in bringing this case.

(R., p.23

1 .)

“Taking these reasons in conjunction” with Halbert’s “failure
rights early

on

in this case,” the district court

0f ﬁnding a speedy

trial

Violation.”

(Id.)

t0 assert his

speedy

trial

found “that the Barker factors d0 not weigh in favor

The court accordingly denied

the motion to dismiss.

(Id.)

The

parties

later

entered into a plea agreement, Which indicated that Halbert

was

reserving his right to appeal from the denial of his motion t0 dismiss (R., pp.199-200, 205.)

Pursuant t0 the agreement, the state withdrew

enhancement (9/16/19 TL, p.17, Ls.2-1

1),

its

Amended

Information and persistent Violator

and Halbert pleaded guilty

and one count 0f felony vehicular manslaughter {9/16/19

Tr., p.26,

t0

L.11

one count of felony

— p.32,

L.15).

DUI

The court

sentenced Halbert to 15 years ﬁxed for the manslaughter count, and t0 a consecutive 10 years,

with one year ﬁxed, for the

DUI count.

(12/16/19 Tr., p.139, L.16

Halbert timely appealed. (R., pp.276-78.)

— p.140,

L.21; R., pp.263-64.)

IS SUE

Halbert states the issue on appeal

Did

the district court err

when

it

as:

denied Mr. Halbert’s motion to dismiss, because

the delay in this case violated his federal and state constitutional rights to a speedy
trial?

(Appellant’s brief, p.8.)

The
Has Halbert
speedy

trial

state rephrases the issue as:

failed t0

show

Violation?

the district court erred

by denying

his

motion

to dismiss for

an alleged

ARGUMENT
Halbert Has Failed

To Show The

District

Court Erred

BV Denying His Motion To

Dismiss For

An Alleged Speedy Trial Violation
A.

Introduction

Halbert claims on appeal that the district court “erred

when

denied his motion t0

it

dismiss, because the delay in this case violated his federal and state constitutional rights to a

speedy

“Contrary t0 the

speedy

trial,

district court’s determinations,

and the prejudice

t0

When

“the district court erred

it

right to a

that the

show

13-month delay due

“neutral,”

were the

fails t0

speedy

trial.”

found n0 Violation of the right

Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), balancing
Halbert

Mr. Halbert’s timely assertion of his right

reversible error.

t0 Halbert’s

reversible error.

if

t0 a

we

him

Therefore, Halbert claims,

speedy

trial

under the BLlccr

If anything, the district court erred in

determining

medical care was “not attributed directly t0” Halbert,

(E R.,

of a car accident he caused while drunk driving.

those injuries should weigh against

But even

(Id.)

test.” (Id.)

and therefore weighed against the government.

direct result

t0 a

Mr. Halbert through the delay impairing his defense, supported

ﬁnding a Violation of his constitutional

V.

Halbert asserts the court got the balancing wrong:

(Appellant’s brief, p.9.)

trial.”

p.228.)

Halbert’s injuries

Any delays due

to treating

alone.

consider this factor neutral, as the court did, Halbert

fails t0

show

Halbert does not contest the court’s determination “that the remaining four

months of the delay was
additionally fails to

show

attributable” t0 him.

that his assertion

was below, Halbert’s claim of prejudice

is

(E

Appellant’s brief, pp.12, 17.)

0f his speedy

trial rights

was

conclusory and meritless. The

timely.

Halbert

Finally, as

it

district court therefore

correctly determined that the Barker factors, taken together, did not

speedy

trial rights.

B.

Standard

mixed question of law and

rights t0 a

trial

at

trial

presents a

App. 2006). The appellate court

court’s ﬁndings of fact that are supported

evidence, but freely reviews the

speedy

State V. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 257, 16 P.3d 931, 933 (2000);

fact.

State V. Avila, 143 Idaho 849, 852, 153 P.3d 1195, 1198 (Ct.

Idaho

a Violation of Halbert’s

Of Review

Whether there was an infringement of a defendant’s

defers t0 the

show

trial

court’s application 0f the

by

law

and competent

substantial

to the facts found. AV_ila, 143

852, 153 P.3d at 1198; State V. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 835, 118 P.3d 160, 167 (Ct. App.

2005)

Halbert Has Failed

C.

To Show A

Constitutional Speedy Trial Violation

“Both the Sixth Amendment t0 the United States Constitution and Article
Idaho Constitution guarantee to criminal defendants the right to a speedy

144 Idaho 349, 352, 160 P.3d 1284, 1287
trial

App. 2007).

When

§ 13

0f the

State V. Lopez,

trial.”

analyzing claims of speedy

Violations under the state and federal constitutions, the Idaho appellate courts utilize the

four-part balancing test set forth

State V.

at

(Ct.

1,

by

the United States

Supreme Court

in BLlccr,

Young, 136 Idaho 113, 117, 29 P.3d 949, 953 (2001); L_ow, 144 Idaho

at

407 U.S. 514.
352, 160 P.3d

1287; State V. Avila, 143 Idaho 849, 853, 153 P.3d 1195, 1199 (Ct. App. 2006). The factors t0

be considered

are:

(1) the length

of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay;

assertion of his 0r her right t0 a speedy

trial;

and

Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.

10

(4) the prejudice

(3) the defendant’s

occasioned by the delay.

Contrary t0 Halbert’s arguments 0n appeal, the balance 0f these factors in

this case

supports the district court’s determination that Halbert failed to establish a Violation of his

constitutional rights t0 a speedy

trial.

The Length Of The Delay Was Sufﬁcient T0 Trigger

1.

An

Analysis

Of A11 Four

Barker Factors

“The length of the delay
delay which

that

t0

some

extent a triggering mechanism.

presumptively prejudicial, there

is

go into the balance.” BLlccr, 407 U.S.

period 0f delay

actual restraints

at

is

is

arrest

and holding

is ‘a

t0

is

some

for inquiry into the other factors

530. For purposes of the Sixth

at

measured from the date there

imposed by

no necessity

is

Until there

Amendment,

“the

formal indictment or information or else the

answer a criminal charge.

997

Lopez, 144 Idaho

352, 160 P.3d at 1287 (citing United States V. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971); Young, 136

Idaho

at 117,

29 P.3d

at 953.)

“Similarly, under the Idaho Constitution, the period 0f delay

measured from the date formal charges are ﬁled 0r the defendant
ﬁrst.”

m,

144 Idaho

triggered, the length

P.3d

at

at

is

352, 160 P.3d at 1287 (citations omitted).

of delay also becomes a factor in and 0f itself.

arrested,

Once

AV_i1a,

is

whichever occurs

the balancing test

143 Idaho

at

is

853, 153

1199.

The criminal complaint was ﬁled 0n March

was ﬁled on August

5,

2019. (R., pp.220, 222.) The state conceded below (R., p.169) and agrees

17-month delay was sufﬁcient

0n appeal

that this

Doggett

United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652

V.

prejudicial until

it

23, 2018, and Halbert’s motion to dismiss

approaches one year);

ﬂ

n.

1

t0 trigger the

(1992) (delay

is

BLker

balancing

test.

generally not presumptively

also State V. Talmage, 104 Idaho 249, 252,

920, 923 (1983) (delay of seven-and-a—half moths

11

was sufﬁcient

E

t0 trigger

658 P.2d

Barker analysis).

However, the length 0f the delay
itself “either

speedy

trial.”

is

None 0f the

four BLlccr factors

by

BLlccr, 407 U.S. at 533. In light of the other factors discussed below, the length of

BLker

factors,

m

should be excused.

252, 658 P.2d at 923 (ﬁnding seven-and-a—half—month delay

at

is

a necessary or sufﬁcient condition to the ﬁnding of a deprivation of the right of

the delay, even if sufﬁcient to trigger the

Idaho

not dispositive.

Talmage, 104

was “not

in itself so

excessive as t0 outweigh the other balancing factors”).

Some,

2.

“[P]retrial delay is often

153 P.3d

at

1199

Of The Delay Was

If Not A11,

(citing

Attributable

T0 Halbert

both inevitable and wholly justifiable.” Avila, 143 Idaho

Doggett

V.

United States, 505 U.S. 647, 656 (1992)); State

V.

at

853,

Davis, 141

Idaho 828, 837, 118 P.3d 160, 169 (Ct. App. 2005) (same). For that reason, different weights are
assigned t0 different reasons for the delay.

Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.

As

explained by the

Supreme Court:

A

deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order t0

weighted heavily against the government.
negligence

or

overcrowded

courts

should

A
be

hamper the defense should be
more neutral reason such as
weighted

less

heavily

but

nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such

circumstances must rest With the government rather than With the defendant.
Finally,

a valid reason,

such as a missing witness, should serve to justify

appropriate delay.

Li. at

531 (footnote omitted).
Halbert implicitly concedes 0n appeal that four 0f the

attributable to him.

by Mr. Halbert’s
light

0f

all

(m Appellant’s brief, pp.12,

requests”).)

He

17 months 0f delay were

17 (discussing “the four-month period caused

never challenges the

district court’s correct

conclusion

that, in

of Halbert’s requests for continuances and waivers of time, “any subsequent delay

following” his “arrival in Jerome County was attributable
[Halbert] in the prosecution bringing

him

to,

to trial.” (R., p.228.)

12

agreed

t0,

0r acquiesced t0

by

As

months 0f

for the remaining 13

delay, the district court

months, Halbert required a “level 0f” medical “care

Jerome County
that

Jail.”

he could receive that care

at

outside of that normally provided at the

The court concluded

(R., p.227.)

IDOC, was

found that during those

that “delay[ing] transporting” Halbert, so

a “legitimate” delay but also “not attributed directly

to” Halbert; thus, the court found “the initial 13-month delay t0 be neutral.” (R., p.228.) Halbert

adopts this analysis on appeal. (Appellant’s brief, p.12.)

The

submits that the

state

“neutral” because

it

was “not

medical care delay was, in

district court erred in

determining the 13-month delay was

attributed directly t0” Halbert.

(R., pp.227-28.)

Halbert’s injuries did not stem

fact, directly attributable t0 Halbert.

from some chronic, underlying condition; he was not a casualty 0f a ﬂuke
a

random

attack. Halbert

another vehicle.

chose t0 drive drunk, crossed the center

(9/16/19 Tr., p.29, L.6

—

p.3

1,

line,

illness 0r the Victim

State’s Exs. 102, 103,

L.18.) Unlike the person he killed, Halbert

104 (summarizing Halbert’s

other care he received t0 treat his injuries».

alone,

error t0 conclude the delay for treating his injuries

ﬂ

surgeries, physical therapies,

and

injuries

was “not

was

and

his

he suffered. As such,

it

enough

attributed directly” to him.

the attribution does not change because, as the court pointed out, “Jerome

that

Jerome County has such a duty.

E

his

was an

County

has the duty t0 provide reasonable medical care for inmates in their custody.” (R., p.228.)
true

was

(R., p.227;

Halbert’s choice to drive drunk

and Halbert was the proximate cause 0f all 0f the

And

many

0f

and collided head-on with

lucky enough t0 survive; but he was severely injured as a result of his actions.

alﬂ

The 13-month

I.C. §

It is

20-605 (“Release from an order

pursuant t0 section 20-604, Idaho Code, for the purpose 0f a person receiving medical treatment
shall not relieve the

county of its obligation of paying the medical care expenses imposed in

section”) But this does not

mean

that

Jerome County was obligated

13

to disrupt Halbert’s

this

ongoing

care and haul

the jail

him

into jail as quickly as possible; Halbert

was not required

to receive his care at

itself.

Rather, once placed in Jerome County jail custody, the county

would have had

the duty t0

provide Halbert With appropriate medical care 0r to transport him to a facility that could have

done

E

so.

LC. §§ 20-604, 20-605; see also

St.

Alphonsus Reg’l Med.

124 Idaho 197, 200, 858 P.2d 736, 739 (1993). This case was in the
level 0f care required to treat” Halbert’s injuries

Jerome County

Jail.”

Never mind

(R., p.227.)

“would have constituted a ﬁnancial hardship

him

for

“to surgeons, physical therapists, radiologists

would have posed a host 0f logistical

Beyond

that, the court

found,

continuity 0f care in the

same

facility

latter category,

that

Jerome County

(9/9/19 TL, p.23, L.23

—

p.27, L.17),

Halbert “would have been difﬁcult at that time, and the
care of him at that time” (9/9/19 Tr., p.24, L.24

— p.25,

L.

jail

IDOC 0n

this

0f acute care
in

having

kept tabs 0n Halbert’s

1).

making the “conscious decision

account of his medical condition.”

to transport

whipsaw

that transporting

would have had a hard time taking

Jerome County had transported Halbert from

If

County jail, they would have just had

And

Who

and who testiﬁed

district court incorrectly faulted the state for

the care he needed.

this level

with the same providers.” (R., p.228.) Those conclusions

IDOC

the alternative?

(R., pp.227-28.)

and there can certainly be considerable value

placement

What was

after the accident

Jail.”

simply “better suited t0 provide

record, including the testimony of the jail deputy

delay transporting [Halbert] from

of care” to Halbert

and other medical providers

by the

Thus, the

at the

Jerome County, and the task of transporting”

are supported

at

because “the

normally provided

that “providing this level

difﬁculties for the

IDOC was

to inmates in [Halbert’s] condition

was “outside 0f

Ctr., Ltd. V. Killeen,

itinerary

14

him back t0 IDOC
would have come

(0r Saint

at a

time

t0

(R., p.228.)

IDOC

t0

Jerome

Alphonsus) to get

when

Halbert was

frequently between surgeries, “nonweightbearing,” With

and with concerns of losing one of

apart,”

his legs,

wounds

among

that

were “actually pulling

other things.

(E State’s Exs.103;

104, pp.4-6.)

and the alternative of a

In light of Halbert’s condition,

the state did the

most reasonable thing

it

could:

it

simply

already receiving the appropriate level of care, until he

the

The

jail.

weigh against

in a

speedy

Halbert stay at

IDOC, where he was

was healthy enough

t0

be transported

trial analysis.

However, even assuming the 13-month delay
17-month delay should

still

point; he agrees that “[W]ith thirteen

attributable to

is

state.

neutral, as the court concluded, the reason

be weighed in favor of the

months of the delay

state.

neutral,

Halbert concedes this

and the other four months

Mr. Halbert, the reason for a delay factor does weigh somewhat against a Violation

0f the right to a speedy
regardless of

t0

Because both the 13-month delay and the four—month

delay are directly attributable t0 Halbert, this factor weighs heavily in favor of the

for the total

Jerome County,

Halbert in the most prudent, safe manner, should not

state’s decision t0 care for

it

let

futile round-trip to

how

trial,

although this factor

the 13-month day

is

largely neutral.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 12.)

So

analyzed, the reason for the total delay does not weigh

is

against the state.

Halbert Failed

3.

The

To Timely Assert His

third factor in the

constitutional right t0 a speedy

BLker
trial.

analysis

A

is

Constitutional Speedy Trial Rights

Whether and

make

it

at

the defendant asserted his

defendant’s assertion 0f his right

evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant

407 U.S.

how

531-32; Da_vis, 141 Idaho at 839, 118 P.3d

difﬁcult for a defendant t0 prove that he

is

is

“entitled t0 strong

being deprived of the right.” BLker,

at 171.

“[F]ailure to assert the right Will

was denied a speedy trial.” Li

15

The

district court correctly

concluded that Halbert did not timely assert his speedy
trial” prior t0 his

motion

to dismiss.

Moreover, Halbert moved t0 vacate a “status conference before

trial to

address pre-trial

Halbert never “assert[ed] his right to a speedy

rights.

p.229.)

trial

issues such as this,” so that he could be “transported t0

IDOC

to continue receiving

(R.,

medical

treatment after multiple continuances.” (R., pp. 126-27, 229.) Because Halbert “waited until two

months before

his trial t0 raise this issue for the ﬁrst time,” the district court correctly held “this

factor does not

weigh

On
163 Idaho

in favor

603.

trial

11,

trial

Violation.” (R., p.229.)

appeal Halbert argues his assertion of the right was timely, citing State

9, 16,

407 P.3d 596, 603

Hemandez—Who was
August

of ﬁnding a speedy

set for trial

2015—“timely

Halbert argues

(Ct.

asserted his right to a speedy trial.”

about two months before the

his

date,”

and

motion

Li. at 12, 16,

Hernandez defendant,” he “asserted

trial

Hernandez,

App. 2017). There, the Idaho Court of Appeals found

on September 28, 2015, and ﬁled

that, “[l]ike the

V.

to dismiss

407 P.3d

on

at 599,

his right t0 a speedy

that this “supports a finding” that

he timely

asserted his rights. (Appellant’s brief, pp.14-15.)

But
that Will

this is a

ﬂawed comparison. Two months

before

trial is

always sufﬁce to show a timely assertion of speedy

examines when a defendant

not an ﬁxed amount of time

asserts his rights relative t0 the entire length

State V. Rodriquez-Perez, 129 Idaho 29, 37, 921 P.2d 206,

Rather, this Court

trial rights.

214

(Ct.

of the proceedings.

App. 1996) (holding an

“assertion 0f his rights at a relatively late point in the proceedings does not

dismissal under the Barker balancing process” (emphasis added).)

Hernandez was not a
in that case to get

arrested

on January

Two months

relatively late point in the proceedings, insofar as

from
9,

arrest to trial.

2015,” and

trial

163 Idaho

was

at 12,

set “for

16

407 P.3d

at

weigh

it

in favor

before

0f

trial in

took only eight months

599 (noting “Hernandez was

September 28, 2015” when Hernandez ﬁled

his

motion

motion

to dismiss).

two months before

to dismiss, so

Compare
23, 2018, and

In other words, only six

trial

that case With this one.

when

(R., pp.109, 220.)

months had elapsed When Hernandez ﬁled

was not

relatively late in the

From complaint

t0 trial

trial

these proceedings, insofar as this case proceeded for over 16

factor

The

this issue.

was

district court correctly

trial

March

September 24, 2019.

set for

would have been 18 months,

length of the proceedings in Hernandez. So, two months before

peep about

game.

Here, the state ﬁled the criminal complaint 0n

Halbert ﬁled his motion to dismiss,

his

far longer than the total

was a

relatively late point in

months before Halbert ever made a

found his assertion was not timely, and

this

weighed against Halbert.
4.

Halbert Failed

T0

The ﬁnal and most important
prejudice suffered

by

He Was

Establish That

Unfairlv Preiudiced

factor in the Barker analysis

the defendant as a result of the delay.

the nature and extent 0f any

is

407 U.S.

354, 160 P.3d at 1289; Davis, 141 Idaho at 840, 118 P.3d at 172.

BV The Delay

at

532; Lopez, 144 Idaho at

As

explained by the Idaho

Supreme Court:
Prejudice

is t0

be assessed in

light

0f the

interests

of defendants Which the right t0

designed to protect. Those interests are (1) to prevent oppressive
pretrial incarceration; (2) to minimize anxiety and concern 0f the accused, and (3)
a speedy

trial is

t0 limit the possibility that the defense will

Young, 136 Idaho

at 118,

29 P.3d

at

954

be impaired.

(citing Barker,

Idaho

at

354-55, 160 P.3d

Idaho

at

840, 118 P.3d at 172. “The third 0f these

at

407 U.S.

at 532).

1289-90; Avila, 143 Idaho at 854, 153 P.3d at 1200; Davis, 141

is

the

most signiﬁcant because a hindrance

adequate preparation of the defense ‘skews the fairness of the entire system.

at

Accord Lopez, 144

9”

t0

Lopez, 144 Idaho

355, 160 P.3d at 1290 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; State V. Hernandez, 133 Idaho 576, 583,

990 P.2d 742, 749

(Ct.

App. 1999)).
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On

Halbert

this score,

fails t0

show any

prejudice whatsoever.

He

simply reasserts the

conclusory arguments he pressed below: that “time has passed,” which Halbert contends “is
prejudicial”;

and

that

facts, times, places

“Mr. Halbert must contact Witnesses, gather evidence, and attempt to recall

and people more than one

signiﬁcant disadvantage and

is

[year] after the incident,”

Which puts him

“at a

highly prejudicial to his case.” (Appellant’s brief, p.16 (citing R.,

p.133; 9/9/19 Tr., p.32, Ls.7-9).)

Rebooting
rejecting

it

this

below.

argument 0n appeal does nothing t0 address the court’s reasons for

First, the court

concluded Halbert “faced no additional risk of being subjected

t0 oppressive pretrial incarceration”

incarcerated before

p.230.)

Beyond

the delay.”

(Id.)

trial

that,

due to any delay in

this case, insofar as

Halbert was already

“from an entirely separate criminal case predating these charges.”

(R.,

Halbert “did not demonstrate that his anxiety or concern was heightened by

The court

additionally rejected Halbert’s claim that he

was prejudiced because

“the state had additional time t0 collect evidence and prepare for trial.” (Id.) “[T]his alone does

not demonstrate substantial prejudice,” the court correctly found, insofar as “the State and
prosecutors have

ﬁve years

to bring felony charges against

an accused.”

(Id.)

“As

its

such, the State

could have legally ﬁled the Criminal Complaint and Warrant in this case [four] years and 364
days from the date 0f the head-on-collision and [Halbert] would have the same potential
disadvantage and prejudice.”

(Id.)

Halbert does not try t0 rebut these points 0n appeal, and he accordingly shows no error.

The

district court correctly

found that Halbert “failed to demonstrate he has suffered meaningful

0r even any speciﬁc prejudice

by the

State’s delay in bringing this case t0 trial.” (R., pp.230-3

18

1 .)

A Balancing Of The Barker Factors Weighs Against A Finding Of A Speedy Trial

5.

Violation

The four BLlccr
and weighed

407 U.S.

at

factors, together

to determine

with any other relevant circumstances, must be balanced

whether an individual’s right to a speedy

In this case, even if the length 0f the delay

533.

constitutional analysis, the remaining factors,

speedy

trial Violation.

The delay was

by Halbert and otherwise
most important

legitimate;

Halbert has therefore failed t0

show

is

violated.

BLker,

sufﬁcient to trigger a

0n balance, weigh heavily against a ﬁnding 0f a

either completely caused

by Halbert, or somewhat caused

he failed t0 timely assert his

factor, Halbert failed t0

was

trial

demonstrate that he was

error in the denial of his

rights;

at all

motion

and on prejudice, the

prejudiced by the delay.

t0 dismiss.

CONCLUSION
The
motion

state respectfully requests this

t0 dismiss

Court afﬁrm the

district court’s denial

and afﬁrm the judgment 0f conviction.

DATED this

14th day of October, 2020.

/s/

Kale D. Gans

KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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